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NOTE
The Havana Club Saga: Threatening
More than Just "Cuba Coke"
Emily Taylor*
I. INTRODUCTION
The trademark dispute over "Havana Club" rum has aptly been
described as "sexier than most."' Most trademark disputes do not result in
half a dozen U.S. court decisions, 2 produce a last-minute U.S. statutory
provision3 that ignites an international treaty dispute,4 or cause a foreign
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. Duke University,
2001. The author would like to thank Clayton Poppe for his patience, humor, and summaries
of the editorials in the Sunday paper.
1 Rum, Macaroni and Bad Politics, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 2002, available at 2002 WL
26770551. Another commentator on the dispute noted that "[t]ruly epic legal fights never
die-they just move to another forum." Jenna Greene, Rum Wars Test World Trade
Organization, 6 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 5 (2000).
2 See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
[hereinafter Havana Club 1]; Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 974 F. Supp. 302
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) [hereinafter Havana Club II]; Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A.,
1998 WL 150983 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Havana Club 1ll]; Havana Club
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) [hereinafter Havana
Club IV]; Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Havana Club V], cert. denied, 531 U.S. 918 (2000) [hereinafter Denial of cert.].
3 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
§ 211, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (incorporating the Department of Commerce
Appropriations Act of 1999) [hereinafter § 211].
4 See WTO Panel Report on United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998 (Aug. 6, 2001), http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/docs e.htm [hereinafter Panel
decision]; WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998 (Jan. 2, 2002), http://www.wto.org/english/docse/docse.htm
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relations quandary. The fight over "Havana Club" rum however, has done
just that.
The saga of the "Havana Club" brand began when the family-owned
distillery in Cuba that created "Havana Club" rum was confiscated by the
Cuban government during the communist revolution. Years later, a dispute
arose as to the rightful owner of the U.S. trademark of the name. In an
attempt to settle the matter, a U.S. statutory provision was passed that
prevents the registration or protection (in the United States) of trademarks
linked to businesses that were confiscated by the Cuban government.5 The
statutory provision, § 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 ("§
21 1,,),6 may have been in keeping with the United States' opposition to
Cuba's communist government and the confiscation of private property, but
it was found to violate the United States' obligations under international
treaty law.7
The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") determined, 8 and the Appellate Body ("AB")
agreed, that § 211 violates 9 the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property1° ("TRIPS Agreement")." The AB requested that the
United States "bring its measure ... into conformity with its obligations"
under the treaty.'
2
This comment will examine the options facing the United States in
light of the AB's determination that § 211 violates the TRIPS Agreement.
Part I will explore the background of the trademark dispute and the
applicable treaty and statutory provisions. Part II will focus on the relevant
portions of the AB's holding. Part III will assess the implications of
potential U.S. responses. Finally, Part IV will explain why compliance with
the TRIPS Agreement is in the United States' best interests.
A. Background
"Havana Club" rum was originally produced by Jos6 Arechabala, S.A.,
[hereinafter Appellate decision].
5 § 211, supra note 3.
6 See id.
7 Appellate decision, supra note 4.
8 Panel decision, supra note 4.
9 Appellate decision, supra note 4.
10 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
Appellate Decision, supra note 4.
12 Id. at 361.
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a family-owned distillery in Cuba.'3 The distillery's rum was distributed
internationally, and the "Havana Club" name was protected by trademarks
in a number of countries. 14 In 1960, the business was confiscated by the
Cuban government. 15 The Arechabala family fled to Spain and the United
States where their attempts to restart the business failed. 16 In 1973, the
family allowed the U.S. trademark of "Havana Club" to lapse. 1
7
Meanwhile, in 1972 a Cuban government enterprise, the Empresa
Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos 8 Productos Varios ("Cubaexport"),
began exporting "Havana Club" rum. Cubaexport registered the "Havana
Club" trademark in Cuba in 1974 and registered the lapsed U.S. trademark
in 1976.'9
In 1993, the "Havana Club" section of Cubaexport was reorganized
into Havana Rum & Liquors, S.A. ("HRL") in order to facilitate a joint
venture with the French liquor distributor Pernod Ricard, S.A. ("Pernod").2 °
In November 1993, Pernod and HRL formed two wholly owned
subsidiaries, Havana Club Holding, S.A. ("HCH") and Havana Club
International, S.A. ("HCI"). 21 Cubaexport transferred the U.S. "Havana
Club" trademark to HRL which later assigned the trademark to HCH.22
While the Cuban-French venture continued to produce "Havana Club"
rum, the Arechabala family sold whatever rights it had to the "Havana
Club" name to Bacardi & Co. ("Bacardi") 23 in a deal formalized in April of
13 Havana Club V, supra note 2, at 119.
14 id.
15 Havana Club IV, supra note 2, at 1090. For an overview of the Cuban government's
confiscation practices, see Jose A. Ortiz, The Illegal Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A
Historical and Legal Analysis of the Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-
Socialist Cuba, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 321 (2000).
16 Misha Gregory Macaw, The New Rum War: Havana Club as a Threat to the US.
Interest in International Trademark Harmonization, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 291, 295 (2000).
17 Ashley C. Adams, Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act: The Threat to
International Protection of US. Trademarks, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 221-22
(2002).
18 Havana Club V, supra note 2, at 120. "Havana Club" rum "has been exported to over
twenty countries since 1973 ... [T]he principal markets for Havana Club rum are Western
Europe, Canada, and Mexico..." Havana Club 1, supra note 2, at 502.
19 Havana Club V, supra note 2, at 120.
20 Id. Pernod Ricard is the third largest distributor of wine and sprits, and includes the
brands Wild Turkey Bourbon, Seagram's Gin, Chivas Regal, and Bushmills Irish whiskeys.
Congressional Cuba Working Group Releases Cuba Policy Review, Seeks Repeal of Section
211; Pernod Ricard USA Applauds Members' Leadership, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 16, 2002,
2002 WL 4577559.
2 1 Havana Club IV, supra note 2, at 1088.
22 Id. at 1090. This transfer of the United States trademark into the ownership of the
Cuban-French company was later an element of the dispute over the trademark's validity.
See Havana Club II, supra note 2.
23 The Bacardi family's Cuban distillery was also confiscated by the Castro regime, on
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1997.24 Bacardi, claiming to have a right to the "Havana Club" name based
on the Arechabala family's consent, began distributing its own "Havana
Club" rum in 1995.25
The dispute between Bacardi and HCH over their respective rights to
26the "Havana Club" name is recorded in a series of U.S. court cases.
There, HCH claimed that Bacardi was infringing upon HCH's registered
trademark, while Bacardi questioned the Cuban-Fench venture's ownership
of the trademark.27
B. U.S. Statutory Provision § 211
The battle over the "Havana Club" name did not remain confined to
the courtroom, however. Bacardi lobbied U.S. Senator Connie Mack, of
Florida, to introduce what became § 21 1.28 The provision was included the
night before the budget bill passed, was never presented on the floor of the
Senate, and is not included in any of the bill's legislative history.29
The text of § 211 states:
(a)
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no transaction of
payment shall be authorized or approved.., with respect to a
mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same as or
substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name
that was used in connection with a business or assets that were
confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or
commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has
expressly consented.
(2) No U.S. Court shall recognize, enforce, or otherwise validate
any assertion of rights by a designated national based on common
October 14, 1960. The family fled and restarted their business in the Bahamas. See Bacardi
Heritage, at http://www.bacardi.com/leam/Heritage.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2004).
24 Havana Club IV, supra note 2, at 1090; the Arechabalas had previously negotiated a
similar deal unsuccessfully with HCH and another liquor distributor. See id
25 Id.
26 See Havana Club I-V and Denial of cert., supra note 2; see also Daniel Carroll,
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A.: District Court Orders up "One Havana Club
Rum and Whatever Congress is Having, " 8 TuL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 507 '(2000). The cases
name Galleon, S.A. as the leading defendant; Bacardi is Galleon's successor-in-interest.
27 See id.
28 Senator Trent Lott added § 211 to the bill at the request of Senator Mack. See A
Special-Interest Cocktail, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2903091; see
also Bruce Rubenstein, Behind the Scenes with Bacardi's Lobbyist, 12 CoRP. LEGAL TIMES
INT'L 124 (2002) (interview with Bacardi lobbyist).
29 See id.
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law rights or registration ... of such a confiscated mark, trade
name, or commercial name.
(b) No U.S. Court shall recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any
assertion of treaty rights by a designated national or its successor-in-
interest.., for a mark, trade name, or commercial name that is the same
as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name
that was used in connection with a business or assets that were
confiscated unless the original owner of such mark, trade name, or
commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly
consented.
(d)
(1) The term "designated national" has the meaning... ["Cuba
and any national thereof, '30] and includes a national of any foreign
country who is a successor-in-interest to a designated national. 3'
Section 211 has three effects. First, § 211(a)(1) prevents any party
from registering or renewing a trademark that is the same as or
"substantially similar" to a trademark that was associated with a business
confiscated by the Cuban government, unless the original owner of the
trademark consents. The provision accomplishes this by preventing anyone
from paying the fee that is required to complete a registration or renewal of
a trademark unless these qualifications are met.32
Second, § 21 l(a)(2) prevents a Cuban entity from gaining U.S. judicial
enforcement of statutory or common law rights for a trademark that is the
same as or substantially similar to a confiscated trademark.
Finally, § 211 (b) prevents a Cuban entity from gaining U.S. judicial
enforcement of treaty rights for a trademark that is the same as or
"substantially similar" to a trademark that was used by a confiscated
business, unless the original owner agrees.
Although the silent, last-minute inclusion of § 211 and the
corresponding lack of legislative history preclude an authoritative statement
of the purpose of § 211, three objectives are met by the provision. First, §
211 determined the outcome of the ongoing litigation between HCH and
Bacardi. After the passage of § 211, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
30 31 C.F.R. § 515.305 (2002).
31 § 211, supra note 3.
32 See Lanham Act § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2002) for the details of the fee and license
system.
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the case,33 which effectively affirmed the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's
dismissal of HCH's claims against Bacardi.34
Second, the provision supports the U.S. policy of non-recognition of
foreign government confiscations.35  The international community has
agreed that the expropriation of private property without just compensation
is illegal. Section 211 prevents rerognition of foreign confiscations by
preventing the registration, renewal, or enforcement of confiscated
trademarks 36 without the original owner's consent.
37
Finally, § 211 extends the goals of the U.S. embargo of Cuba.38
Enacted in 1963, the embargo was the U.S. response to the establishment of
a communist regime in Cuba, Cuba's increased ties with the Soviet Union,
and the Cuban government's confiscation of American property.39 Section
211 advances the goals of the embargo by preventing the Cuban
government from profiting from confiscated trademarks.4 °
C. TRIPS Agreement
After being denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court, and thus
exhausting its U.S. legal remedies, Pernod lobbied the European
Communities (E.C.) to bring a suit against the United States in the WTO
claiming that § 211 violates the United States' obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement. 4'
33 Denial of cert., supra note 2.
34 See Joseph Bradica, Havana Club Rum: One Step Back for U.S. International
Trademark Policy, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 147 (2002). "We conclude that the Cuban
embargo barred assignment to HCH of the 'Havana Club' trademark registered in the United
States, that we are precluded by [§ 211] from enforcing whatever rights HCI might have to
trade name protection.., and that HCI lacks standing to assert its false advertising and
unfair competition claims.. " Havana Club V, supra note 2, at 119.
35 See Adams, supra note 17, at 230.
36 The term "trademark" is used throughout this article to refer generically to intellectual
property and is not used as a term of art excluding other forms of protected property.
37 See § 211, supra note 3.
38 See Adams, supra note 17, at 229-30.
39 See id; see also Bradica, supra note 34, at 153-57. The regulations outlining the terms
of this embargo are the Cuban Assets Control Regulations ("CACR"). See 31 C.F.R. pt. §
515. The CACR were enacted under § 5(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act ("TWEA").
See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44, as amended by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
("IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-6 (2004). TWEA gives the President "broad authority to
impose comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries..." Havana Club 1, supra note 2, at
500 (quoting Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1984)). The President delegated this
authority to the Secretary of the Treasury who created the Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") to oversee the embargo. See id. (OFAC also administers embargoes against
other countries).
40 See Adams, supra note 17, at 230.
41 See generally Panel decision, supra note 4. The EU claimed that § 211 violated the
registration, enforcement, and National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment
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The TRIPS Agreement was created primarily to "preserv[e] the
interests of the intellectual property industries that are the mainstay of many
Western economies. ',42 More specifically, the Agreement was created to
provide a "coherent, enforceable body of norms, rules and procedural
regulations administered by an institutional authority vested with the
necessary powers to execute a global intellectual property mandate. ' ' 3 The
Agreement is the "most comSrehensive multilateral agreement on
intellectual property ever signed."
The TRIPS Agreement deals with the "availability, scope and use" as
well as the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 5 In addition to its
own requirements, the TRIPS Agreement incorporates certain provisions of
an earlier intellectual property treaty,46 the Paris Convention of 1967. 47 This
extends certain Paris Convention protections to states party to the TRIPS
Agreement.
D. WTO Decision
In the WTO DSB, the Panel held that the U.S. statutory provision, §
211, violated only one provision of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel
found that § 211(a) (2) violated Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement.4 8
Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement requires that member states provide
"fair and equitable procedures" to "right holders" of other member
nations.
49
The Panel held that because § 211 restricted Cuban and other foreign
nationals' access to U.S. courts to enforce intellectual property rights, it
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement: that § 21 l(a)(1) violated Articles 2.1 and 15.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement and Article 6 quinquies (A)(1) of the Paris Convention; that § 211 (a)(2)
violated Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 2(1), 6bis,
and 8 of the Paris Convention; and that § 211 (b) violated Articles 2.1, 3.1, 4, 16.1, and 42 of
the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 2(1), 6bis, and 8 of the Paris Convention. See Panel
decision, supra note 4, 8.6-8.10.
42 Ruth Okediji, TRIPs Dispute Settlement and the Sources of (International) Copyright
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 585, 608-9 (2001). It is worth noting that the TRIPS
Agreement is a "one size fits all" agreement that "bind[s] both developed and developing
countries to similar levels of intellectual property protection." Id. at 609.
41 Id. at 586.
44 Bradica, supra note 34, at 147.
45 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at 83. For discussion of the WTO dispute process,
see WORLD TRADE ORG., THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES (2d. ed. 2001).
46 Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583, 24 U.S.T. 2140, 827 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/
wo020en.htm [hereinafter Paris Convention].
47 Articles 1-12 and 19 of the Paris Convention are incorporated into Parts II, III, and IV
of the TRIPS Agreement. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at 85.
48 Panel Decision, supra note 4, T 8.102.
49 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at 100.
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deprived member states of "fair and equitable procedures."5 ° The Panel
recommended that because of this "nullification or impairment of the
benefits accruing to the [E.C.] under the TRIPS Agreement," 51 the DSB
should "request the United States bring its measures into conformity with
its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement."52
II. APPELLATE BODY DECISION
The United States and the European Community appealed the DSB
decision. The United States appealed the Panel's decision regarding "fair
and equitable procedures" and the European Union appealed all other
issues. 53 The AB54 issued its report on January 2, 2002, finding that § 211
violated two provisions of the TRIPS Agreement: national treatment and
most favored nation treatment.55
A. National Treatment
Both the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention, as incorporated
into the TRIPS Agreement, require that member states treat their citizens
and the citizens of other member states equally with regard to access and
protection of intellectual property rights.56  This national treatment
requirement has "long been a cornerstone of the Paris Convention and other
intellectual property conventions ... [as well as] the world trading system
that is served by the WTO.
57
The TRIPS Agreement's national treatment provision, article 3.1,
states that "[e]ach Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection of intellectual property ... ,,58 "Protection" is
defined to include "matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope,
maintenance and enforcement of intellectual property rights.. ."9 Article
50 See Panel decision, supra note 4, 4.91-.96.
51 Id. 9.2.
52 Id. 9.3.
53 Claims were filed in October 2001. See Appellate decision, supra note 4, 12.
54 Panel was comprised of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (Presiding Member), James Bacchus,
and Julio Lacarte-Mur6. See id. 363.
55 The additional claims brought by the European Union were that § 211 violated the
Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement requirements for the registration of trademarks,
enforcement of trademarks, exclusive use of trademarks, and protection afforded to trade
names; that § 211 violated article 6 quinquies (A)(1) of the Paris Convention, and articles
1.2, 15.1, 16.1, and 42 of the TRIPS Agreement.
56 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at art. 3.1; see also Paris Convention, supra note
47, at art. 2(1).
57 Appellate decision, supra note 4, 241.
58 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at art. 3.1.
51 id. at n. 3.
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2(1) of the Paris Convention states that "[n]ationals of any country of the
Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in all
countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now
grant ... ,60
These provisions require the United States to provide citizens of other
member countries the same access to registration and protection of
intellectual property rights that is afforded U.S. citizens. The European
Community claimed that the United States failed to provide such national
treatment to either original owners or bona fide successors in interest of
confiscated trademarks. 61 First, the European Community claimed that §
211 discriminates against Cubans who are original owners of U.S.
trademarks that are the same as or substantially similar to confiscated
Cuban trademarks.62 The European Community claimed that § 211 was
discriminatory because it forced Cuban nationals to undergo a § 211 (a)(2)
hearing before granting them access to U.S. courts to enforce their
trademark rights, while U.S. nationals were not required to undergo this
hearing.63
To illustrate its point, the European Community presented a
hypothetical situation in which two original owners of U.S. trademarks that
are the same as confiscated Cuban trademarks seek to enforce their U.S.
trademarks.64 One of the parties is a U.S. national, the other is Cuban; this
is the only difference between them.65 In this situation, the Cuban national
would be required to undergo a § 21 l(a)(2) hearing while the U.S. national
would not.6  Therefore, the European Community claimed that this
represents less favorable treatment for foreign nationals.
67
The United States argued that the apparent discrimination in § 211 did
not exist in reality. First, the United States claimed that the Cuban entity in
the hypothetical would always be permitted to enforce its trademark rights
because "original owners are always in a position to consent expressly to
their own assertion of rights. 68 This argument assumes, however, that the
original owner of the U.S. trademark is also the original owner of the
confiscated Cuban trademark; this is not always the case.
69
60 Paris Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2(1).
61 See generally Appellate decision, supra note 4, 9 233-296.
62 Id. 9 275.
63 See id





69 Id. The United States made additional arguments in rebuttal which were rejected by
the Appellate Body. See id. 9 283-195.
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The United States also argued that this hypothetical situation would
never occur because the Cuban entity would have registered its trademark
before the restrictions included in § 211 (a)(2) were put in place.70 This
argument also failed, however, because it would only be true for statutory
registration rights.7' Section 211 (a)(2) applies not only to these rights, but
also to common law rights, which the Cuban entity could have claimed after
the regulation was in effect.
72
Finally, the United States claimed the Cuban entity in the
hypothetical could be considered an "unblocked" entity under certain
provisions of the Cuban embargo, meaning that it would be treated the same
as a U.S. entity and that § 21 1(a)(2) would not apply. 73 The AB stated that
in order to "fulfill the national treatment obligation, less favorable treatment
must be offset, and thereby eliminated, in every individual situation that
exists under a measure." 74 Because the AB found that in certain instances a
Cuban national would not qualify for "unblocked" status, it rejected this
argument.
Therefore, the AB held that the United States violated the national
treatment provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris Convention by
providing less favorable treatment to Cubans who are the original owners of
U.S. trademarks that are the same or substantially similar to confiscated
Cuban trademarks.76
In its second claim regarding national treatment, the European
Community claimed that the United States violated the national treatment
requirements of the treaties as they pertained to non-U.S. successors-in-
interest to trademarks that are the same as or substantially similar to
confiscated Cuban trademarks.77
The European Community claimed that § 211 is discriminatory
because it forces "designated nationals," which includes Cubans and any
"national of any foreign country who is a successor in interest to a
designated national,', 78 to meet the requirements of § 211 in addition to
successfully completing an OFAC hearing.79 U.S. nationals, in contrast, are







76 See id. 290.
71 Id. 246.
78 § 211, supra note 3, § 211 (d)(1).
79 Id. 246.
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undergo an OFAC hearing. The European Community claimed that
meeting the requirements of § 211 amounted to an "extra hurdle" for
foreign nationals that were not required of U.S. nationals.
8 1
The United States attempted to rebut this argument by claiming that
this apparent inequality would never exist in reality. This, the United States
claimed, was because under other provisions of the Cuban embargo,82 a
U.S. citizen would never become a successor-in-interest to a trademark that
was the same as or substantially similar to a trademark confiscated by the
Cuban government.83  Therefore, the fact that U.S. citizens were not
included in the requirements of § 211 (a)(2) would not matter since they
could never be in the situation where § 21 1(a)(2) would apply.84
Furthermore, the United States argued that under its "longstanding
doctrine of non-recognition of foreign confiscations," no U.S. court would
recognize claims brought on a confiscated trademark. 85  Therefore, the
United States argued this doctrine would serve the same purpose and have
the same effect as § 211, and applied to U.S. nationals as well as foreign
nationals.
86
Nonetheless, the AB held that these arguments were insufficient to
solve the discriminatory nature of the provision. The AB held that since
non-U.S. successors-in-interest would still be forced to surpass an "extra
hurdle" that was not required of U.S. nationals, the provision provided less
favorable treatment. 87  Therefore, the AB held that § 211 violated the
national treatment provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and the Paris
Convention.88
B. Most Favored Nation Treatment
In addition to requiring member states to provide national treatment,
the TRIPS Agreement also compels member states to provide most favored
nation treatment. This means that any benefits a member country bestows
80 id.
"I Id. 256.
82 See id. $ 249.
83 See id.
84 See id. The United States also claimed that it did not matter that U.S. citizens were
excluded from § 211 requirements because no U.S. court would enforce a U.S. national's
assertion of claims to a confiscated trademark because of the U.S. doctrine of non-
recognition of foreign confiscations. The AB held that this doctrine would apply to all
parties, U.S. or foreign, and that this failed to remove the "extra hurdle" placed on foreign
nationals. See id 266-67.
85 Id. 266.
86 Id.
7 Id. 99 265, 268.
88 Id.
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upon its own nationals it must also afford to nationals of other member
countries. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement states that "[w]ith regard to
the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favor, privilege or
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall
be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other
Members.,
89
The debate regarding § 211 's possible violation of the TRIPS
Agreement's most-favored-nation treatment provisions paralleled that of the
national treatment dispute. 90 The European Community claimed that § 211
violated the TRIPS Agreement by favoring U.S. successors-in-interest to
trademarks the same or substantially similar to confiscated trademarks by
exempting them from the additional requirements imposed on Cuban and
other foreign successors-in-interest.
The United States' rebuttal arguments mirrored those made in its
discussion of the national treatment provisions. The United States claimed
that 1) Cuban national original owners of confiscated Cuban trademarks
could consent to use of the U.S. trademark; 2) that the statute was not in
effect when Cuban nationals registered their trademarks; 91 that 3) Cuban
nationals could be "unblocked" and treated as U.S. nationals; 92 and 4) that
U.S. citizens were not eligible to be in the situation where the additional
requirements would apply. 
3
The AB also followed the same reasoning that it had with regard to
national treatment and determined that § 211 violated the most favored
nation treatment provision of the TRIPS Agreement.
94
III. IMPLICATIONS
As a result of its finding that § 211 violated the national treatment and
most favored nation obligations of the United States under the TRIPS
Agreement, the AB "recommend[ed] that the DSB request the United States
to bring its measure.., into conformity with its obligations" 95 under the
TRIPS Agreement.
89 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, at art. 4.
90 With the exception of the fact that the provision was only disputed with regard to
Cuban confiscations and only to the level of successors-in-interest. See Appellate decision,
supra note 4, 303-04.
9' Id. 7311.
92 Id. 311.
93 Id. T 310.
94 Id.
95 See id. T 361. For further commentary on the effects of § 211 and the AB decision on
international intellectual property rights and the Cuban embargo, see Robert Dufresne,
Assessing Clashes and Interplays of Regimes from a Distributive Perspective: IP Rights
Under the Strengthening Embargo against Cuba and the Agreement on TRIPS, 24 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 767 (2003).
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Under the rules of the DSB, the United States was granted an initial
period in which to comply with the ruling; on March 28, 2002, the parties
agreed that the United States would comply by January 3, 2003.96 Since
that time, the United States has negotiated with the European Commission
for an extension until December 31, 2004.9
A. Treaty Compliance
In order to comply with the national treatment and most favored nation
status provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, the United States must remove
the discriminatory provisions of § 211. The United States could do so by
altering the provision so that all original owners or successors-in-interest to
trademarks that are the same as or substantially similar to confiscated
Cuban trademarks are required to undergo a § 211 hearing to determine the
consent of the original owner of the Cuban trademark.98 The AB noted that
its finding did not comment on the right of a member state to refuse to
recognize foreign confiscation of private property without just
compensation; 99 it was only the discriminatory nature in which the United
States completed this objective that the AB found to violate the TRIPS
Agreement.1
°°
The advantage to preserving § 211 by extending its requirements is
that the United States would be able to continue to prevent the Cuban
government from profiting from confiscated trademarks. The disadvantage,
however, is that this would increase the administrative costs of registering,
renewing, and enforcing trademarks by forcing all parties wishing to
complete such a transaction for a trademark that is the same as or
substantially similar to a confiscated Cuban trademark to undergo an
additional hearing.
The United States could also comply with the AB ruling by repealing §
211. A number of parties have supported this option, including the
Congressional Working Group, a bipartisan group comprised of 40
96 Mark P. Sullivan and Maureen Taft-Morales, Congressional Research Service -
Cuba: Issues for Congress, at CRS- 17 (2003).
97 United States - Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998 - Modification of the
Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, Dec. 24, 2003, WT/DS176/14, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/distabase-wto-members4_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2004).
98 This paper assumes that if the United States were to alter § 211, it would do so in order
to fully comply with the mandate of the AB. It is worth noting, however, that there have
been other instances in which the United States has been accused of "less than full
compliance." See Okediji, supra note 42, at 605-06.
99 Appellate decision, supra note 4, 362 ("The validity of the expropriation of
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members of the U.S. House of Representatives. 1 ' The Congressional
Working Group characterized § 211 as an "improper intervention in a
private trademark matter in favor of a foreign interest.' 0 2
In addition, USA*Engage, a "coalition of over 650 United States
businesses engaged in trade and investment abroad," supports the repeal of
§ 211.103 The organization favors the repeal of § 211 over its alteration in
order to achieve treaty compliance because of potential "retaliation by
foreign countries" which would remove the protections of U.S. trademarks
abroad found in "bilateral and multilateral agreements outside of TRIPS."' 1 4
B. Non-Compliance
If the United States refuses to comply with the AB's decision, it may
result in the assignment of compensation and the suspension of concessions
by other member states.'0 5 The WTO considers these to be temporary
measures and less desirable than full compliance, 10 6 yet as long as a country
remains non-compliant, such measures may be imposed. 10 7
In order to suspend concessions, the prevailing party in the dispute
must request authorization from the DSU to suspend concessions or other
treaty obligations. 0 8 The concessions suspended should relate to the same
sectors in which the DSB or AB found a "violation or other nullification or
impairment."' 1 9  There should also be proportionality between the
"nullification or other impairment" and the concessions requested."t0
The DSU is required to adopt the requested concessions unless there is
a consensus agreement within the DSB to deny the request."' This
presumption of adoption prevents parties from being able to block the
implementation of concessions."12
In addition to retaliatory measures under TRIPS, countries may
retaliate on the basis of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 13
101 Congressional Working Group, A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, May 15, 2002.
There have also been repeated, though unsuccessful, attempts in Congress to repeal § 211.
102 Id. at Part V.
103 USA*Engage, Letter to Chairman Max Baucus, (July 18, 2002) (on file with author).
04id.
105 See Okediji, supra note 42, at 623.
106 See id.
107 World Trade Org., THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: A COLLECTION OF
THE RELEVANT LEGAL TEXTS (Cambridge University Press, 2d. ed. 2001).
108 Jose Felgueroso, TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Understanding: The First Six
Years, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 165, 178 (2002).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 180.
"l Id.
112 Id.
113 See Adams, supra note 17, at 239.
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This is exactly what Cuban President Fidel Castro has threatened."14
Castro argues that, under the Vienna Convention, he is permitted to retaliate
against U.S. non-recognition of Cuban trademarks by refusing to recognize
U.S. trademarks.1 5 He has stated:
[The United States] should not complain if we start using any North
American brand to produce and commercialize products. We are not going to
remain, of course, with our arms crossed. .. Maybe there are some who say,
Caramba! Let's taste Cuban Coca-Cola. Or brand-name perfumes, or other
goods sold in duty-free shops." 
6
The Congressional Working Group fears exactly this response. The
Group states that § 211 "frees Cuba of its legal obligation to honor the more
than 5,000 U.S.-owned trademarks registered in Cuba. Section 211 places
American product trademarks at risk, violates our international obligations,
and undermines U.S. credibility in defending intellectual property rights."'"17
C. Effects Immediately within Cuba
Allowing Cuba to stop recognizing U.S. trademarks could have
negative repercussions for American business as well as for consumers in
Cuba and possibly elsewhere. First, American companies doing business in
Cuba could be economically harmed by the inability to enforce their
exclusive rights to trademarked materials. Companies using well-known
brand names such as "Coca-Cola®, Aunt Jemima®, Huggies®, Weight
Watchers®, Kool-Aid®, Reebok®, Nike®, and United Airlines®" all
operate in Cuba and rely upon trademarked materials." 8 If Cuba fails to
recognize these trademarks, counterfeit products could be manufactured and
marketed in Cuba free from litigation. 1 9
In addition, the removal of trademark protections could result in harm
to consumers. 120  Counterfeit products of sub-standard quality, including
114 See id.
115 See id.
116 Juan 0. Tomayo, Fidel threat: We '1l make our own Coke; Cubans angry at Bacardi 's
use of 'Havana Club,'MIAMI HERALD, May 11, 1999, at 1C (quoting Cuban President Fidel
Castro).
117 Congressional Working Group, supra note 101.
118 Adams, supra note 17, at 240-41; see also Anthony Boadle, Cuba, Denied Rum
Brand, Could Make "Coke", REUTERS, June 7, 2001 ("Moving either to protect their brand
names or position themselves for the day when the embargo is lifted, an increasing number
of American firms are registering trademarks in Cuba.") (quoted by Global Exchange, at
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cubalUS-Cuba/reuters06O701 .html).
119 Adams, supra note 17, at 241.
120 Id. at 239-40.
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"drugs... alcohol, construction materials, and components for cars,
airplanes, and even space shuttles," could pose substantial risks to
consumers. 121
Finally, freeing Cuban companies to take advantage of U.S.
trademarked materials could provide an economic benefit to the Cuban
government. 122 This would not only be contrary to the goals of the Cuban
embargo with regard to economic isolation of Cuba, but would also be a
political victory for Castro, contrary to the embargo's goal of destabilizing
his totalitarian regime. 
123
D. Future Effects in Cuba
In addition to these immediate effects, allowing a trademark standoff
with Cuba to proceed into a war of retaliation could be detiimental to
American interests in the future of Cuba. Although the international
community has agreed with the United States on the need for a democratic
government in Cuba and has condemned the human rights violations of the
current regime, many countries continue to develop trade relations with
Cuba. 124
These countries have adopted a policy of engagement instead of• • 125
isolation in dealing with Cuba. The United States "remains the only
developed country that prohibits its corporations from investing in
Cuba." 126  The fact that foreign investors are already establishing
themselves in Cuba, combined with the refusal to respect American
trademarks could make it difficult for American corporations to invest in a
post-embargo Cuba.1
27
121 Id. at 240.
122 Id. at 242-43.
123 For information regarding the goals of the Cuban embargo, see supra note 39. Of
course, allowing Cuba to ignore U.S. trademarks would also be antithetical to the purpose of
§ 211, which created this situation in the first place.
124 Kathleen S. Adams, Subchapter III of the Helms-Burton Act: A Reasonable Assertion
of United States Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 21 HAMLINE L. REv. 147, 148 (1997); see
also Bernadette Atuahene, The Effectiveness of International Legislative Responses to the
Helms-Burton Act, 69 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 809, 829 (2000). Canada, for example, is Cuba's
largest trading and investment partner.
125 John J. Coughlin, Cuban Foreign Investment Act: Opportunities for United States
Corporations in a Post-Embargo Era, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 299, 303 (1999); see
id at 299 (Cuba opened to such foreign investment with the passage of the Cuban Foreign
Investment Act in 1995); see generally Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible
Engagement in an Era of Economic Integration, 5 YALE HuM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. (2002) for a
discussion on the ethical and policy implications of U.S. policy instead of engagement.
126 Coughlin, supra note 125, at 299.
127 There are other obstacles which will have to be considered as American companies
begin investing in Cuba, including developing a system for restitution for past confiscations.
See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 15; see also Bradley T. Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation
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E. International Effects
These future interests in Cuba implicate other countries as well. If a
Cuban company with foreign interests is using a confiscated trademark, §
211 would reduce its ability to expand to the United States if the embargo is
lifted. This insecurity regarding confiscated materials is compounded by
another U.S. regulation which allows U.S. entities to bring claims against
foreign companies that are trafficking in confiscated U.S. property. This
provision, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity ("LIBERTAD")
Act of 1996 is commonly known as the Helms-Burton Act. 128
The Helms-Burton Act fights the use of confiscated property in three
ways. First, it provides a private right of action to U.S. nationals against
foreign entities that are profiting from the use of confiscated property. 29
Second, it allows the U.S. to exclude from any U.S. territory any "corporate
officers, directors, or controlling shareholders, including their spouses and
minor children, of companies which derive any economic benefit from the
use of confiscated Cuban property."'130 Finally, the Act imposes civil and
criminal liability against lending institutions that loan capital to entities
benefiting from confiscated property.' 3 '
The international response to the Helms-Burton act has been "virtually
unanimous" and anything but positive.' 32 Opposition to the Act has taken
three forms. First, many countries have requested that the United Stats
repeal the measure. 133 The United Nations General Assembly, for example,
has passed multiple resolutions objecting to the Act. 134  In addition, a
declaration has also been signed by leaders from 48 nations denouncing the
Act.135 Second, many countries have passed blocking or counter legislation
which prevents the U.S. law from being effective in other countries. 36
Policy, 8 TEX. Hisp. J. L. & POL'Y 79, (2002).
128 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2002) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]; see also S. Kern
Alexander, Trafficking in Confiscated and Cuban Property: Lender Liability under the
Helms-Burton Act and Customary International Law, 16 DICK. J. INT'L L. 523, 525-26
(1998). Although proposed prior to the incident, the Helms-Burton Act was passed in its
current stringent form after two civilian planes were shot down by Cuban fighter jets in the
Florida straits.
129 Alexander, supra note 128, at 523.
130 Id. at 523-34.
131 Id. at 524.
132 Jorge F. Perez-Lopez and Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law and its
Antidotes: A Classic Standoff?, 7 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 95 (2000) [hereinafter Antidotes].
133 See Atuahene, supra note 124, at 852.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id, see also Perez-Lopez and Travieso-Diaz, supra note 132, at 96
("Countermeasures have been put in place by Canada (October 1996), Mexico (October
1996), the European Union (November 1996), and Argentina (September 1997). Cuba also
enacted antidote legislation in December 1996 and February 1999.").
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Finally, the validity of the Act has been challenged by the European
Union in the WTO as violating customary international law and treaty
obligations. 137 The E.U. agreed to drop this claim in the WTO in response
to negotiations with the United States over the issue. However, the issue
remains unresolved and the E.U. has warned that it "retain[s] the option of
using formal dispute settlement procedures against the United States in ...
light of its continued recourse to barriers on trade and inward
investment."
138
Another international effect of U.S. non-compliance is the detriment it
will have on efforts to harmonize intellectual property protections
worldwide. 139  The United States has traditionally been a "staunch
supporter" of harmonizing intellectual property protections, 14 especially in
light of the volume of globalized marketing and trading that affects the U.S.
economy. 4 1 Through harmonization of the processes and protections of
intellectual property, businesses can more easily engage in such
transnational transactions.
Refusal to comply with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement
would represent a break in U.S. policy of working toward harmonization;
the resulting retaliation could discard the progress achieved through the
TRIPS Agreement.
Finally, the U.S.'s willingness to renege on its obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement sends a mixed message to developing countries which
often have little incentive to apply the protections to intellectual property
mandated by developed countries. 142 If the rules of the agreement are not
followed by one if its strongest supporters, less enthusiastic countries may
decide that they are not bound by the agreement either.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The AB decision that § 211 violates the TRIPS Agreement presents a
difficult challenge to the United States. Not only will the U.S. response
trigger domestic disputes over the future of the Cuban embargo and the
responsibility of the United States to adhere to its treaty obligations, but
137 John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Reconsidering Blocking
Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures of the United States, 30 L. &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 439, 486 (1999); see Atuahene, supra note 124, at 810. There may also be
a claim that the Helms-Burton Act violates NAFTA.
138 EU Criticizes Continued US Barriers to Trade and FDI Inflows, MARKET NEWS INT'L,
Nov. 20, 2002, available at 2002 WL 103469148 (citing European Commission annual
report).
139 See Macaw, supra note 16, at 322.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 322-23. The United States loses "billions of dollars a year in exports because of
the inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in foreign countries." Id. at 323.
142 Id. at 323-34.
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may also implicate far-reaching international disputes.
First, with regard to the domestic response to the AB's ruling, it is
important to note the current controversy over the Cuban embargo.
Increasingly, there are calls for lifting the embargo. 143 The Cuban embargo
has failed to remove Castro from power and has exacerbated the suffering
within Cuba. 44 In addition, it has denied U.S. businesses the ability to
invest in what could be a close and growing market.
Meanwhile, there remain the "feverishly anti-Castro Cuban-American
voters in Florida .... [who] won't tolerate even a semblance of trade
normalization with Cuba.' 45 This powerful lobby group 146 may present an
obstacle to those who would support the repeal of § 211. On the other hand,
many American business interests support the repeal of § 211 in order to
prevent Cuban retaliation and the non-recognition of American trademarks.
Furthermore, the response of the international community to § 211 and the
Helms-Burton Act show that the United States' isolationist approach to
Cuba may have larger implications for American businesses abroad.
Certainly, the potential for future U.S. investment in Cuba is
threatened by acts such as § 211 and the Helms-Burton Act. Additionally,
however, the United States may find itself facing current opposition from
other countries in other trade areas in response to the U.S.'s actions
regarding Cuba. It is these larger implications that show the true extent of
damages resulting from non-compliance with the AB decision. If the
United States refuses to comply with its obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement, the consequences that it faces could extend beyond simply
Cuba.
For these reasons, the United States should comply with the TRIPS
Agreement by repealing § 211. Although the United States might be able to
143 See USA*Engage, supra note 103.
144 See Havana Club I, supra note 2, at 510; see also Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Letter to the
Editor, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1997, at A22 (quoted in Havana Club I, supra note 2, at 502).
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., former special advisor to President Kennedy has stated:
As one involved in the Kennedy Administration's Cuban policy, may I note that the United
States embargo was laid down at a time when Cuba was a Soviet base and when it was
organizing attempts to overthrow other Latin American governments. Neither condition
obtains today.... A better policy [than preserving the embargo] would be to repeal Helms-
Burton, lift the embargo and drown the regime in American tourists, investments, and
consumer goods.
145 Rum, Macaroni, and Bad Politics, supra note 1.
146 One commentator stated that the political organization, the Cuban American National
Foundation, is "something to behold.., so powerful that when in full effect it can paralyze
Congress and even influence national trade policies." Rolando J. Santiago, Y2K, The
Millennium for a Revised U.S.-Cuba Trade Policy: Grounds for Removing the Embargo, 6
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REv. AM. 169, 176 (2000).
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comply with the TRIPS Agreement and the AB mandate by altering § 211
to extend to U.S. nationals as well as Cuban and other foreign nationals,
there is still a risk that the United States would face repercussions of its
actions in other arenas.
47
Therefore, the United States should repeal § 211 in order to fully
comply with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and under the
WTO Dispute Settlement system.
147 See USA*Engage, supra note 103 ("[W]hile universal application of 201 might satisfy
TRIPS compliance standards, this "solution" endangers countless U.S. trademarks around
the world that are preserved by bilateral and multilateral agreements outside TRIPS,
resulting in costly and unnecessary litigation and retaliation by foreign countries.").
